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3The literature on Barcelona-based separatism that came out of the 1930s, seemed to agree that
the visible demostration of Catalan radical nationalist strength in the early 1930s was akin to "fascism".
Specifically in 1933, a huge debate exploded within Catalan politics with regards to the "fascist
tendencies" of a part of the separatist movement and the label stuck, fanned especially by
anarchosyndicalist propaganda1. This opinion came to be shared, just to cite a few English-oriented
sources, resonant with their influence on later historians, by E. Allison Peers (who saw the Catalan
imitation of the military-type organization of fascism), Gerald Brenan (who bluntly perceived "Catalan
Fascism"), and Salvador de Madariaga (who spoke of "a colored-shirt corps which it was difficult to
distinguish from a Fascist organization")2. Curiously enough, Franco régime partisans could share similar
indignation at such a development: the "falangista" Maximiano García Venero referred to a "xenophobe
fascism, naturally paramilitary and bourgeois"3. A y uthful Dalí, quite the adolescent radical nationalist
(he was tried for burning a Spanish flag), later remembered the October 1934 uprising in Barcelona as a
revolutionary chaos dominated by a "shirt movement"4. Outside historiography has tended to follow this
broad spread of sources, while Catalan researchers, afraid of such a delicate topic, have avoided the
controversy5. Why the damning affirmation, shared by such a broad spectrum of critics and enemies?
Interestingly enough, however, given the overall right-wing bias of the sources cited, there was no
equivalent insistence on the importance of a specifically Catalan communism, which, as an ideological
current, was in fact much more pervasive in radical nationalist politics at the time. Admittedly, the
neologism "rojoseparatista" was extensively used by Francoist propaganda, but the implication was that
the revolution of 1936 had produced a fusion, hitherto trivial, of negative impulses, an opinion even
foreign observers seemed to share. Why the disproportionate interest on the alleged "fascist" trend in
Catalan separatism?
Demonizing Militancy versus Exculpatory Activism
There has been remarkably little exploration of the suppositions with which, since the end of
World War II, political historiography has judged the validity of ideological options. Even the collapse of
the Soviet Union has evoked more cautious moderation in concepts, within a difuse continuity, than any
significant revision of value judgments that often date back to the 1930s. A movement like Catalan
separatism, well within the overall trend of Western European interwar politics, but which stood in
marked contraposition to what might be termed "the standard examples", accordingly might serve as an
indicator towards some rethinking, without however having to bear the cost of challenging the
omnipresent ideological symbolisms that still weigh down international political categorizations. This
suggestion, in any case, would be the ultimate ambition of the present article. The axiomatic premise
would be that the demonization of the radical right and, in compensation, an exculpatory attitude towards
the extreme left are very much a product of the interwar European scene, but that the contradictions that
accompany this process are best observed in a lateral place like Barcelona that nonetheless remained
politically trendy.
It is almost a cliché to stress how, after 1918, the techniques of trench warfare were promptly
applied to civil strife. Both bolchevism and fascism were born together in the Great War, ideological
4twins -insofar, as regards dates and hatreds- whose existence was simultaneously justified by the struggle
of one against the other6. What differentiated them? Simply, how they wished to be seen.
Despite the numerous colonial antecedents in previous decades, Schrecklichkeitliterally
"terribleness" or the capacity to carry out fearful deeds, only became a conscious objective of
contemporary military science with the Germans in World War I. German Army tradition did not
-perhaps even could not- c ntemplate the implications of irregular warfare, and acted accordingly in
occupied territories on the western Front7. As a direct consequence, Allied propaganda had a natural vein
to exploit, and turned what the Germans conceived as didactic harshness into an exceptional savagery,
understood as perversely immoral insofar as it was carried out by the most advanced society on the
continent. The debate was focused on the limits of military and, by extension, political behavior and arose
from the crossed accusations surrounding German atrocities in Belgium and France in the first months of
the Great War: while the Germans considered that civilian populations had duties of obedience to the
occupation authorities, the Belgian and French (and eventually Allied) position, on the contrary, held that
civilians had no fixed duties to observe, while occupying forces were subject to a moral obligation to
uphold exceptionally good comportment with persons and properties (especially with materials of
historical value, deemed irreplaceable) under their control. Formulated in these terms, the discussion was
posed between a "realist" viewpoint, which argued that the supposed realities of power invoked
automatically the need to submit to superior force or suffer the logical consequences, and the
"humanitarian" perspective, which insisted that moral laws, commonly recognized, ruled the relation
between belligerents, above any practical objective. Both sides argued that the other acted with bad faith.
Mutual recriminations generated a vast literature and defined attitudes on the conflict in both belligerent
and neutral countries, very particularly in Spain, where direct traces of this debate determined the initial
moral positions of the contenders in the Civil War twenty years later8.
The turbulence of politico-social life in postwar Europe, which shifted in countries like Russia,
Hungary or Germany (and territories like Ireland or Finland) from world struggle to internal strife with
scarcely a visible transition, was quite naturally defined by the positive-negative conceptualizations of the
earlier war years. The non-bolshevik left assumed humanitarian discourse as its flag: just as touted in the
most idealistic slogans of the Allied cause, the recognition of citizen's rights was synonymous with
Democracy. In direct opposition, the new "revolutionary" right, which boasted of having been born in the
mud of the trenches, took up, for the first street battles, the inheritance of Schr cklichkeit:  has been
remarked how in the turmoil of 1919-1922, the "death's-head" was the unofficial common emblem of
proud "streetfighting men" from the Baltic to the Adriatic9. For their part, the bolsheviks took an
equidistant position from such "petty bourgeois" delusions: they gloried in being on a war footing (class
war) with its resulting disposition to utilize any means at its disposal, while, at the same time, when
convenient, they made a show of humanitarian goals, if always in an abstract and doctrinal way. In its
beginnings and almost halfway though the 1920s, bolshevism was a very contradictory amalgamation of
leftist components, but eventually, thanks to the ideological rivalry with what it called "fascism", the
"contradictions" were ironed out.
In other words, in the ongoing process of codification of ideological discourses which dominated
the early 1920s, and until mutually discernible ideological roles stabilized in the latter half of the decade,
5only those who became "fascists" voluntarily assumed their de onizat on, that is, the arrogant assumption
of a negative characterization with which their enemies categorized them, asserting themselves, by way of
reply, as agressive antihumantiarians who were proud of the fact. Strict socialists, together with social-
liberal mixtures, both untempted by Bolsehvik successes, took on the democratic flag of civil liberties.
Bolsheviks preferred to argue that the end justified the means, so that they could enjoy the blessings of
forming part of the world of civilized values, when such was useful, and do whatever they saw fit
politically when they could act without discretion. Allegedly free of hypocrisies, the "fascist" response,
marking its distance from tremulous conservatives, appropriated externally imposed demonization as a
sign of political identity, without any expression of guilt.
This "demonization effect" impacted on counterrevolutionary efforts in postwar years in many
places: for example, Ireland in 1919-1921, where the "Black and Tans" and the "Auxiliaries", official
anti-republican shock units enjoyed an "esprit de corps" derived from being "worse" than their terrorist
opponents, an easy attitude in forces dedicated to the erradication of a "guerrilla" enemy protected by a
social context10. But the significant factor was the privatization of willfully assumed demonization, or,
more concretely, the manner in which such sentiments could be exercised by a political organization
ultimately devoted to recruitment, as opposed to a threatening public force attempting to alienate support
for a political enemy. In Germany, such demonization offered a straight continuity from wartime
experience, being flaunted two scant months after withdrawal from the Western front (and not even that
brief time in the East). The "assault sections" of the German "Free Corps", which so actively fought
against the "reds" in Finland or the Baltic as much as in their now republican Fatherland, had no problems
of transition, since they felt they had undergone a fluid evolution from the prewar ideological
exaggerations of pangermanism, to the stance of "total war" during the European conflict, and, from
there, to a struggle without quarter against the bolshevik "Weltfiend", by definition a repugnant outsider
wherever he might be found11. But, in Italy, the move to demonization was taken from traditional left
stances, socialist and syndicalist, following Mussolini, in the wake of a right-wing nationalist poet like
D'Annunzio, and accordingly represented a genuine psychological break. Not surprisingly, the slogan of
the early bullyboy fascism of the "squadristi" was quite explicit: "Me ne frego!". It was self-affirmation
of the roughest sort, inverting the rejection of the left, with all its pretensions to moral superiority, and
telling the leftists, with all the harsh reality of a cudgel, where they could stuff their norms and their much
vaunted humanitarianism.
With his striking capacity to catch questions floating in the Zeitgeist, and give them a successful
spin, Spanish essayist José Ortega y Gasset remarked, in February 1925:
On the other hand, fascism is illegitimate, one could say illegitimist, in a privative sense, truly
strange and almost paradoxical. All revolutionary movements take power illegitimately; but what
is curious about fascism is that not only does it seize power illegitimately, but that, once
established, it also exercises power with illegitimacy. This differentiates it radically from all
other revolutionary movements. [...] Fascism and its clones [sus similares] administer, with a
sharp eye [certeramente], a negative force, a force which is not theirs -the weakness of the rest
[of political forces]. For this reason, they are transitory movements, which does not mean that
they will last only a short time12.
In a similar vein, over a decade later, towards the end of the Spanish Civil War, the Catalan
conservative regionalist leader Francesc Cambó speculated in his diary on the progressive, even slow,
impact that demonization had on the perception of fascism outside Italy:
6As long as fascism was an Italian phenomenon, without pretension to becoming an export article,
Fascist Italy only had friends thoughout the world. As soon as it wanted to turn itself into an
exportable product, Antifascism has sprung up everywhere. All the adventurers in the world have
proclaimed themselves fascists; Mussolini has had idolaters and followers everywhere...[sic] but
also everywhere enemies have arisen against him.
Before, except for the poor Italian fuorusciti, no-one hated fascism. The hatred of the socialists
was more token than felt. Today [January 1938], it's just the opposite13.
Possibly the difference was one of tone. The emotional appeal of fascism lay precisely in its
willful imposition of statist, soldierly values (obedience, duty, hierarchy) on the disorder of social
interaction. The State would swallow civil society whole, and discipline its unruliness. The justification
was that, simply put, market relations, and the associative life that expressed them, would never assume
the dirty work of developing the outermost, most backward corners of society. In fact, the legitimation of
the Soviet régime was not far different, leaving aside idiosyncracies of ideology and belief. But in
fascism, for all its promise of future growth, the accent was, present-minded, undoubtedly on the
imposition itself, on the taste for discipline. Communism, although it never hid its ruthlessness in this
respect and, thus, its utter disgust at any associative life outside Party and State, preferred wisely to
emphasize the benefits to be derived, rather than the taste for discipline as such. As a result of such varied
emphasis, the ideal of the Soviet "new man", always seemed metaphorical, even when most literall4.
Conversely, the "new man" similarly idealized by the fascist movements, always loomed like a sinister
version of Karel Capek's contemporary image of a "robot", soulless and frighteningly literal, even as a
metaphor15.
Nationalism based on Civil Society or on the State?
How did all this apply in Catalonia? Certainly, from a nationalist standpoint, it was a "frustrated
society", to the extent that it was marked by the structural defeat of non-Statehood and by the incapacity
to realize its special "imagined community"16. Spain remained outside the international conflict of 1914-
1918, virtually the only territory on the entire coastline of the Mediterranean and Black Seas to stay both
neutral and (torpedoed vessels aside) free of the costs of war or the presence of armies. At the same time,
however, Spain was involved in its own war in North Africa, which went from relative "low intensity" to
a fullblown national crisis after a defeat by Abd el-Krim's Riffian forces in 1921. Not surprisingly, the
more extreme Spanish and Catalan nationalists sought solutions by idealizing different struggles. Catalan
radical nationalism forged its image in the mirror of Italian interventionism in the European conflict, so
similar in its pretense of successfully mixing nationalism and socialism, but also took heart and critical
distance from the example of militant Irish independentism, contrary to the Allied cause. Spanish radical
nationalism looked to another "intervention", in Morocco, but eyed with very mixed feelings the
alternative European belligerents. Put in other terms, the redesign of the European State-system was
understood as attractive from a Catalan nationalist standpoint, for the effects such change might have on
Spain, while, on the contrary, Spanish nationalists regarded favorably precisely anything that might
reinforce "national unity" and State power.
Undoubtedly, in the interwar years, statism -the fullblown idealization of the State- was a
dominant ideal. Seen as innovative, born of war planning and apparently confirmed by the "crash" of the
early 1930s, the interventionist State, capable of marshalling resources on a vast and previously
7unimaginable scale, seemed a panacea to fascists, communists, "New Deal" liberals and virtually all the
ideologies which, at the time, claimed to incarnate youth and represent the future. Nevertheless, the
Catalan nationalist tradition had been founded on the guiding principle of the superiority of civil society
to the State, a natural perspective for a movement without any historical experience in statist terms, but
with confidence in its inherent superiority, endowed with practical "know-how", as the leading industrial
area (centered on a quickly growing metropolis, Barcelona, which was outstripping Madrid in size) of a
predominantly backward, agrarian country17.
In direct consequence, the conservative Lliga Regionalista, which dominated the "catalanist"
cause for the first thirty years of the century, never stopped insisting that the route from identity to the
reform of the State was forever inseparable from an outstanding respect for civil society18. The repetition
surrounding the existence of a powerful "Catalan bourgeoisie" is best understood in this light, less a class
in the marxist sense than an exaltation of a winning social software. The "founding father" of modern
Catalan nationalist doctrine, Enric Prat de la Riba, defined Catalonia as possessing a "differential fact", a
clear personality expressed in a distinct civil society adjusted to the values and habits of industrialization,
and therefore a "nation" endowed with full national rights, in the face of backward Spain. But he offered
the idea of "empire" as a compromise to Spanish centralists, a solution which could be like the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy or Dominion status within the British system. The clever philosopher Eugeni D'Ors,
who gave the Lliga its peculiar ideological shine with "noucentisme", took Prat's ideas further, and posed
Catalonia as the encarnation of "mediterranisme", the historical mix of order, serenity and spiritual
innovation, neo-classical values that allegedly characterized Mediterranean Europe and the Latin
tradition19. D'Ors has been considered the importer of "French fascism" -i.e. Maurras and "philosophical
nationalism"- into Spanish intellectual life by way of Catalonia, but, in fact, what counted was the
wrapping20. In a Spanish context, with a working monarchical government, Maurras' ideas, which he
accepted being defined as "Un César avec des fueros", boiled down to little more than was already being
offered by historic Carlist royalism21. Even Cambó, often rather unfairly claimed as a philofascist for his
political essays in the 1920s, was in fact a rather doctrinaire liberal, undoubtedly conservative, willing to
be openminded about possible instrumental aspects of a fascist experience he badly underestimated, but
never willing to go beyond American-style "presidentialism" in his call for greater executive power22. All
these formulations might be considered conservative, even reactionary, but they did not favor the
expansion of State power. On the contrary, they insisted on the importance of civil society as the defining
component in any political balance. This ambiguity regarding the Spanish State was the hallmark of
Catalan regionalism. Catalan republicans shared similar feelings, which, in their case, would be expressed
as abstruse federalist doctrine.
In contrast, Catalan separatism was a singularly u thoughtful movement, without intellectuals or
significant ideological elaborations; the speculations of "avantguardista" intellectuals, like Salvat-
Papasseit, Foix or Carbonell, however prone to independentism these might have been, remained for the
most part in a different category from the political working of organized radical nationalism23. Prat de la
Riba's basic ideas on Catalonia, shorn of any ambitions external to Catalonia proper (even to the point of
avoiding "Pancatalanist" formulations regarding other Catalan-speaking territories in Spain, France or
Italy), were grafted onto an explicitly anti-imperialist discourse, elaborated by a psychologist, Dr.
Domènec Martí i Julià, an early example of the overrepresentation of physicians in radical nationalism,
8who established little more than some simple ideas about how small nations -a  opposed to big empires-
were inherently pacific and happily kept to themselves24. But the principal contribution of Catalan
separatism to the overall ideological formulation of Catalan nationalism was the codification of a
symbology of absolutes, based on the premise of "all or nothing". The fact was that Separatist doctrine
was trapped between its roots in the idealization of civil society and its call for full self-determination,
which would mean forcibly an independent Catalan State. By elaborating a package of rituals and images
around the ideal of independence, separatism could resolve its dilemma between the affirmation of
Statehood and its contraposition in the affirmation of society and social norms. Because of its emphasis
on purist symbolism, separatism, regardless of its real political weight at any given time, became the
formal opposite to the most exalted Spanish nationalism, at least in Barcelona and the Catalan areas that
might gravitate towards the city. In fact, together radical Catalan and Spanish nationalisms defined the
parameters of a specifically Barcelona-based political sub-system. Even if separatists consistently
demostrated their incapacity to articulate an electoral option, their representational function guaranteed
the equilibrium of electoral politics in Catalonia, and especially the good health of those parties with
which they shared at least some values25. Similarly,  separatist defense of Catalan civil society could go as
far as considering the "libertarian movement" (i.e. anarchists and anarchosyndicalists) as a full member of
the same, to the extent that it was precisely a defender of individualism and free associations. The
relevance of separatism, therefore, should be sought outside of strict politics, and perceived through
political anthropology.
The first organizational signs of ideological separatism appeared in the 1890s, in some of the
youth associations within the Unió Catalanista, an umbrella-organization for the diverse early strands of
nationalism, and a welter of groups and contradictory opinions26. The Unió youth showed the natural bias
of Catalan society towards "grass roots" politics: small entities, which spontaneously reflected the
dominant pattern of male sociability, with between one or two dozen affiliates, capable of putting out a
succession of short-lived periodicals27. An almost trivial incident -the first activist celebration of the
nationalist holiday, the "11th of September", in 1901- was the formal starting point of Catalan separatism
and in itself made apparent various components that, from then on, would characterize the movement.
Approximately thirty young male service workers in Barcelona tried to leave a wreath at the monument to
Rafael de Casanova (hero of the doomed Catalan resistance to Bourbon arms in 1714), and were chased
by the police, with numerous arrests and the establishment of a commemorative grouping, called La
Reixa in memory of the prison bars shut behind those who suffered for the cause28.
As the 1901 incident showed, Catalan separatism defined itself as predominately young and
masculine. With time, given its relationship with the growth of mass sports in Catalonia (hiking as a
participatory form, soccer and basketball as spectacle), radical nationalist association became, for the
middle layers of society with pro-Catalan sympathies, a "rite of passage" between the worlds of children
and adults29. Many young males passed through extremist associations, becoming "socialized" as firm
catalanists en route to other turning points in life, like marriage and a stable job, after which they also
became regionalist voters and spectators of the "Barça", the sentimentally nationalist football team in
Barcelona30. Sports played an enormous role in the invention of separatism: one of the first significant
sport groupings, for example, was an association of hikers in 1876, formed as a quasi-Mazzinian secret
society, although the bellicose rhetoric was of less consequence than the enjoyment of tramping around
9the countryside and discovering the national heritage. More importantly, however, was the negative effect
of the growth of organized sports. The exponential surge of sport-related activities in Catalan urban
society slowed the progress of separatism, since sporting clubs offered an organizational alternative to
party-building, as well as a cheap and easy  sensation of ideological combat, both of which cut off the
excitement of more strenuous paramilitary bonding. In the measure that systematic competitions between
rival teams were established, and such events took a powerful hold over ever-increasing audiences, a
successful sports club like the "Barça" served as a symbolic anti-Spanish "army" (against the Royal
Madrid team or the rival "Español" club in Barcelona). As such, it served to let off accumulated
ideological steam, instead of channeling discontent towards violent political action31. Rad na alism,
thus, was born parallel to regionalism and/or Catalan republicanism, and could not overcome its
dependency on more moderate options.
Ideologically, the most extreme confrontational relationship of young ultra-catalanists was with
an equally radical Spanish nationalism. Liberal nineteenth-century Spanish nationalism was based on an
institutional model, in which all citizens had to participate in a representative Nation-Institution;
centralism was the guaranty of equal rights. Only with the insinuation of the colonial crisis in the 1880s
into metropolitan politics could there begin to be seen a new type of nationalism, based on identity rather
than institutions. With roots deep in the unending Cuban civil war of 1868-1898, the kind of identity
nationalism was existencial, confused the individual and the collective, and consequently had a strong
hysterical flavor, especially visible after the loss of the overseas empire in 1898. Both radical
nationalisms -the ultra-Catalan and the ultra-Spanish fou d their immediate justifications in the other32.
As a result, from the beginning of the last century onwards, extreme separatism generated a counter-
identity to Spanish civic reality that was both absolute in ideological terms as well as emotionally viable.
On the one hand, Catalan radical nationalism relied, albeit conflictively, on the growing capacity of
moderate regionalism to act as a pressure group in the Spanish political system, from 1901 on, and
especially after 1907. On the other, ultra-catalanists claimed a moral superiority as regarded the
regionalists, engaging them in a love-hate interaction that reeked of adolescent-adult tensions. Separatists
insisted that they expressed true collective fervor against possible double-dealing by the less enthusiastic,
but, at the same time, accepted tacit regionalist support. For their part, moderates used extremist threats as
proof of their own inherent reasonableness when negotiating in Madrid. In response to catalanist shadow
games, hyper-Spanish nationalism, according to social situation, either bid for a similar backing from
young army officers in Catalan garrisons and their growing lack of discipline (marked by their burning of
the regionalist press offices in 1905) or, more speculatively, looked towards the formation of a social-
political left indifferent or hostile to any autonomist demands (Alejandro Lerroux's Radical Party in 1908,
the "Solidaridad Obrera" -origin of the CNT- as of 1907)33.
The sociological background of this conflictiveness was the urban expansion of Barcelona,
which doubled its population twice between 1900 and 1930. Socially, the growth was based on the
economic jump beyond the old Catalan family structure in business and the full acceptance of an
economy of urban services. But, as the initiatives of the private sector were followed by the development
of a public offer which needed to be staffed, who was to profit from the promises and the possibilities of
social mobility that this service economy offered? Should the Barcelona service sector be a part of the
already existing Spanish market for social promotion, under State auspices, as was being promised by the
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militarists, and, with the promise of an acceleration in job offers, by the "lerrouxistas"? Or should it be, as
the syndicalists declared, a socially ascendant labor market on an industrial scale, that promised moral
and material improvement for proletarian migrants, at the expense of any other, allegedly "vested",
interests? Or, finally, should it be reserved for the children of the Catalan peasants, artisans, and workers,
a protected area of public services which guaranteed the use of the Catalan language, as the regionalists,
and especially the separatists, emphasized? The fight for control of social promotion through the service
sector was the secret energy that moved all the key ideological players in Catalonia, which explains their
Barcelona-centric viewpoint.
Logically, in the measure that the immigration increased during the years of the First World War
-both that of outside Catalonia as well as the internal one, from towns and countryside to the city-, the
aggressivity of the Catalan and Spanish radical nationalisms also grew. The division of ultra-Spanish
nationalism between the extreme right and the extreme left, however, limited its possibilities of clear
organizational evolution. Ultra-Catalan nationalism, on the other hand, even if restricted by its
generational dependency on regionalism, could make a political synthesis that was completely original.
The alternative to Mussolini: a fascism of the left?
The example of Garibaldi represented the conceptual basis of all truly extremist politics
-democratic, republican, anarchist- in nineteenth-century Catalonia34. Thus, in the first two decades of the
twentieth century, young separatists fed on the insurrectional tradition of the left, and added the dream of
a combat framework to the declarations of sympathy for other oppressed nations that were being
expressed by the regionalists. At the outbreak of the First World War, the great Garibaldi's grandsons
formed a Legion with Italian volunteers beside the French for the "little nations" crushed by absolutism35.
While the elderly Unió Catalanista shriveled in 1915-1916, the separatists entertained themselves with a
campaign, of much noise and scant substance, to imitate the Garibaldini in France36. As a result, once the
Great War ended, separatism had been transformed. It had adquired for the first time a characteristic form
of party structure, a more or less unitary para-military pattern of style, that permitted it to fuse the
different initiatives and suggestions of independentist symbols (such as the lone-star flag)37.
In January-February 1919, Francesc Macià founded the Federació Democràtica Nacionalista
(FDN), literally a "federation" of "democratic nationalist" local entities in Barcelona neighborhoods and
outlying towns, with the intention of channeling a variety of impulses towards armed action while at the
same time establishing a party capable of electoral activity. The FDN inherited the mantle of purist
nationalism from the Unió Catalanista. In 1915-1916, the Unió's president, Dr. Martí i Julià, had hoped to
utilize the sympathies born the Great War to relaunch the organization, rather worse for wear, as a new
kind of "nationalist and socialist party". Despite the enthusiasm he provoked among the shop and office
workers which formed its activist core, the Unió was burnt-out shell, with no future, and the new impetus
somewhat paradoxically brought it to a halt, breaking Martí's heart and hastening his death in 1917. There
was, therefore, an opening of sorts in Barcelona politics for a party capable of representing nationalist
opinion in the service sector, which was increasingly affiliated in the CADCI (Centre Autonomista del
Comerç i de la Indústria), something between a syndicate, a bourse de travail, nd a recreational center,
the perfect model of a "corporation" in the European sense. The Barcelona CADCI, founded in 1903, had
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spread, under regionalist protection, to other Catalan cities38. In a parallel way, the enitites and schools
promoting Catalan language education -another form of social promotion- served as a support within civil
society, linking radical and moderate nationalists39.
In Catalonia, as in other countries and territories (such as Italy or Ireland), the end of Grea  War
led to a veritable explosion of enthusiasm for Wilsonian self-determination, under the mistaken
conviction that the peace settlement would bring all manner of satisfaction40. In November 1918, while he
headed mass demonstrations to celebrate the end of war and the breakup of the Central Powers, Macià
announced the formation of a hypothetical "Partit Obrer Nacionalista", capable of mixing worker
demands (seen though the eyes of the service sector) with the realization of a "Free Catalonia", all
understood as a part of the triumph of the "small nations" and the defeat of empires. It was a global
context, as seen optimistically from Barcelona, in which some kind of international parliament would take
form in the League of Nations. With such a program in hand, the project for a "Nationalist Workers'
Party" became the FDN. Starting from its narrow base among ultra-catalanist service workers, Macià's
hope was to link up various political forces on the Catalan left, from the Partit Republicà Català (PRC) to
the most pro-allied and legitimist sectors of the Carlist movement, so as to lead streetfighting in
Barcelona against the Liga Patriótica Española, an ephimeral combat group composed of ex-carlist
followers of Vázquez de Mella and similar elements favorable to a Spanish nationalist rebuttal of the
"separatist threat", with strong support from police and army officers in Barcelona's military headquarters.
The idea of a campaign of streetfighting led by the FDN not only pleased the service sector
youth activists anxious for organizational growth of a paramilitary sort (exemplified by Daniel Cardona),
but also acted as a permanent pressure in the name of the coaligned left on the conservative Lliga, since
the regionalist chief Cambó had accepted to lead the agitation for an "Integral Autonomy Statute" to
widen the powers of the limited regional administration in the heady days of "Wilsonism" after November
1918. The wave of CNT-led strikes that carried the winter into the spring of 1919, however, cut off
nationalist hopes for autonomy, isolating a suddenly irrelevant Macià. Expecting to recover the initiative
lost in the social troubles of 1919, the FDN made a great effort in the February 1920 municipal elections,
but its Barcelona candidacy failed miserably41. Given the results, the FDN went into hibernation. Macià, a
stubborn man, independently wealthy through marriage (he was one of the largest landowners in Lleida),
kept at his idea.
A special ultra-Catalan mixture was produced with more than a slight Italian flavor, even though
it was expressed by analogy with the Irish War of Independence of 1919-1921. The "Catalan Literary
Revival" took off into avant-garde experiments, which were "futurist", based on the proud claim that
Marinetti had copied a Barcelona initiative42. Inspired by the spirit of the times, salesmen, clerks,
students, and moderate labor activists, were all fused together as dreamers of national and social
revolution for Catalonia after 1919, under the charismatic leadership of Macià. In fact, it was the same
mixture that Mussolini, also in 1919 (the Fasci di Combattimento were founded in Milan in March, about
a month after Macia's spate of streetfighting was over), had made with the late Garibaldism and the
interventionist synthesis of nationalism and socialism, justified with the complaint that the revolutionary
inheritance of the Risorgimento was being destroyed and decorated with the appeal to the Futurist avant-
garde and D'Annunzio's innovations in political style43. If, as has been argued, Mussolini's fascism was a
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"heresy of the left", Catalan separatism, so similar in content and so ready (at least during the years of the
Great War) to admire Italian interventionism as a model, remained faithful to the same early values, but
nonetheless on the left through the immediate postwar period44. Mussolini, on the contrary, was blocked
by the left from whence he came and, consequently, had to expand and evolve towards the demobilized
officials of the Italian army and then rightwards. But Macià's separatism found itself in the streets with
the military on the other side of the fight (a special irony, as Macià had been a career army officer). Thus,
the Italian strikes of 1920 made Mussolini's fortune as a "new right", original in its tactics and appeals in
a conservative context. But, in Catalan circumstances, with its enemies on the right, placed on the left but
without forming a part of the new revolutionary "obrerismo" ("workerism"), Macià's incipient nationalism
had little choice: it could not survive the anarchosyndicalist strikes of 1919 unless it actively opened up to
its left in both discourse and action. An important component of the FDN's and, later, Estat Català's
alignment with the republican left and with the CNT was the importance of masonic participation in part
at least of its leadership and mid-level militancy45. Eve tually, with the shared experience of exile and
underground opposition to a military dictatorship after 1923, a situation in which everything was a mere
theatre of images, and one organization's promise of revolution in theory as good as another's, could this
nationalism adquire the means to become a populism on a mass scale.
All civil society against the State: a nationalist-syndicalist alliance?
The successful "nationalist-socialist" mix firmly on the left which was characteristic of Catalan
separatism seemed to become almost unique in Europe as the 1920s progressed. Conventional wisdom,
even at the time, would agree that such ideological speculation, relatively common in the twenty-five
years before 1914, had become exclusively an emblematic sign of the postwar "new right", albeit with
different ideological content in different countries. When, in 1923, the Catalan socialist Rafael Campalans
cheerfully announced to distinguished foreign visitors like the German physicist Einstein and the French
mathematician Hadamard that he was going to establish a "national-socialist party" -eventually the Unió
Socialista de Catalunya (USC)-, both apparently told him that it was an incomprehensible mix (although
Einstein apparently later admitted Campalans' explanations). Nevertheless, Campalans' clever dialectical
solution has served very well since then in Catalan politics; rooted in Martí i Julià's distinctions,
Campalans announced in the pages of a separatist weekly that there were bad (imperialist, oppressive)
and good (liberating) nationalisms, and that "conscious" socialists would pick the one while opposing the
other46. In the mid-1920s, French communist support for anti-imperialist nationalism in Germany and
Morocco, however contradictory and self-serving, kept this distinction alive and helped justify Macià's
position, when later he found himself the center of attention in Paris for his abortive invasion of Catalonia
in November 1926. Catalan separatism's pro-Riffian stance was equally racist, but it assured an open line
to the Komintern, which Macià used to travel to Moscow in late 192547. But this trick was possible
because the extreme left in Catalonia was represented by the anarchosyndicalists and anarchists,
committed to a "libertarianism" with which Macià could come to terms, to the point that for a time he
financed the CNT.
The participation of the Lliga Regionalista in the Maura government of 1921, after Spanish
defeat in Morocco, accentuated internal tensions and ultimately provoked the division of regionalists and
nationalists, the latter forming a new party, Acció Catalana, the following year. Macià (a Lliga member
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until 1912) took advantage of the circumstances to realign his former FDN followers. More clearly than
before, Macià in 1922 defended a neo-federal solution for Catalonia, influenced by Irish events: in his
view, Catalonia should secede from Spain and thereafter negotiate an Iberian Confederation; the
spontaneous union of all Catalans, a new "Catalan Solidarity" like that of 1907, but also a "Sacred Union"
like the wartime sentiment in French politics (and perhaps an explosion of nationalist feeling like that
provoked by Italian interventionists) would give such a position social backing, while the formal
proclamation of full sovereignty would be formally made by all elected Catalan representatives (like the
Irish Dáil, as a sort of historical correction to the failed "Assembly of Parlamentarians" convoked by the
Lliga in 1917). The result would be the "Catalan State". Macià proposed to establish an armed force, the
"Army of Catalonia" to defend the newly proclaimed régime, as, by his lights, had been done in Ireland.
Strictly speaking, therefore, Estat Català (EC) was not conceived of as a political party, but rather as a
civic and military platform for collective defense, with Macià at its head in virtue of his experience (he
had been lieutenant coronel of engineers until his opposition to officer indiscipline -the burning of the
regionalist press in 1905- led to his retirement and a new political career). He presented his ideas, without
success, to the Conferència Nacional Catalana in June 1922, which gave birth to Acció Catalana. A month
later, Macià proclaimed his position -with all the organizational conditions that accompanied it- in a
public act at the CADCI hall. Committed as he was to the idea of a unitary platform, Macià pretended that
he was resurrecting the FDN: the party biweekly, L'Estat Català, begun in November 1922, maintained
this fiction, which was finally abandoned in January 1923, when EC established links with other parties,
like the nationalist split of the Spanish socialists, the USC, headed by Campalans, or with the "militarist
wing" of Acció Catalana, and, eventually, following this line of relations, with Basque and Galician
nationalists (in a quite fantastical "Triple Alliance" expected to function as a peninsular balance to Abd
el-Krim)48.
General Primo de Rivera's coup d'état in mid-September 1923 took Estat Català immediately
underground or into exile, as one of the formal excuses for the military action had been the nationalist
street demonstrations in Barcelona that surrounded the proclamation of the "Triple Alliance", and the pro-
Riffian shouts there expressed. Macià promptly became the self-proclaimed president of the "Catalan
State" in French exile, with all the pretensions implicit in the term49. At the sa e time, he hoped to recruit
and train volunteers for his "Army" from among Catalan economic migrants in France, as well as from
disaffected youth in the "interior" (where the clandestine groups soon invented the term "escamots"
-squads- for their loosely coordinated units). Initially, it seemed as if the "interior" underground would
look preferably to the "militarist" sector of Acció Catalana. Even before the military coup, these partisans
of armed action established a Societat d'Estudis Militars (SEM), which, however, soon lost its sense of
direction in discussing such abstractions as the efficacy of Catalan cavalry or of submarines for coastal
defense50. Younger, more practical activists took over and practiced some "terrorism", the ocasional bomb
or attacks on the shop windows of "traitors"51. The political leadership of Acció Catalana, unable to agree
with Macià, proceeded to address the League of Nations with Catalonia's plight, in itself a worthless
gesture, as Geneva was not empowered to intervene in "minority national" questions except where the
Paris peace treaties so indicated. It would be Joan Estelrich of the Lliga, acting for Cambó, who
successfully participated in the network of parallel associations to the League, largely under German
patronage, that maintained the revindications of "oppressed nationalities" under international discussion
during the 1920s52.
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All this effort was sustained with Macià's personal fortune, and, further, with money collected by
Catalan patriotic organizations in America, especially in Cuba, Argentina and Uruguay. The first contacts
towards an insurreccional alliance, on one hand, were held with republicans, anarchosyndicalists and with
the Partido Comunista de España (PCE), and, on the other, with the "Aberri" Basque nationalist fraction
(led by Eli Gallastegui) between late 1923 and early 1924. Such connections promised a hypothetical
uprising for the summer, in a broader political framework, that included the liberals of Santiago Alba and
various republican currents. The initiative of a simultaneous Bilbao-Barcelona revolt was soon
abandoned, but the idea was retained by Spanish anarchist groups based in France, among immigrant
workers53. These groups attempted the uprising on their own, but failed (what took place were little more
than shootouts on the Vera de Bidasoa border in Navarre and in Barcelona, in November 1924)54. This
failure, in addition to the progressive consolidation of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, led to new
negotiations for an insurrection, out of which arose in January 1925, the "Free Alliance" ("free" in the
sense that, upon victory, all agreements were off) between Estat Català, the CNT, the PCE and the
"Aberri" Basques. In reality, however, this "understanding" was reduced to a collaboration between EC
and the CNT, as both the communists and the Basque nationalists were effectively neutralized by the
Spanish police. In addition, the agreement on the Riff later that same year between Paris and Madrid
reduced Macià's possibilities from exile, while French and Spanish police cooperation curbed the
anarchists.
Macià also had to face complications in his relations with the radical nationalist underground in
Catalonia, an almost standard difficulty of Spanish exile groupings in modern times. Cardona and his
friends headed the armed struggle inside Spain, while Macià was the world leader for the cause from
exile. However, Cardona's insistence on an immediate uprising against the Spanish régime brought
confrontation with Macià and he soon was excluded from EC. In the meanwhile, the bulk of Acció
Catalana's "militarist" wing followed Miquel Ferrer and Josep Rovira into Estat Català, becoming the core
on the "Interior Organization"55. I  mid-1925, upon the police's discovery of a good part of the
ultranationalist underground (the immediate arrests of the "Serra del Cadí" group, responsible for the
abortive Garraf "bomb outrage" on king Alfonso XIII's train, and of the SEM remnants under Dr. Miquel
A. Baltà), Cardona installed himself permanently in Perpignan, from where he retained the relationship
with the "Aberri" Basque nationalists. Cardona used the name of Bandera Negra (a historical allusion, but
not unaware of the anarchist tone), the title chosen by the "Serra del Cadí" group for itself and which,
from within Catalonia, had symbolized a unity project for radical nationalism, ideally bringing
"macianists" and others together with some elements of Acció Catalana, a thesis already superseded by
events56. This argument became Cardona's obsession, and he continued to intrigue against Macià,
especially in relation to the catalanist emigrant associations in South America57.
Compelled by French police pressure, Estat Català and the anarchists started their aventure at the
end of September and early October of 1926. Any initiative by the anarchists was cut short by the well-
informed Spanish authoritites (the so-called "Complot del Puente de Vallecas"), while the "Army of
Catalonia" was stopped and captured by French gendarmerie before crossing the border into Spain (often
labeled the "Prats-de-Molló affair" after the border town where Macià was arrested), thanks to a typical
indiscretion, combined with infiltration on part of the Italian Sicurezza. In fact, Macià had recruited
15
Italian anti-fascist immigrants to create a "Legió de la Llibertat" and some of these left a trail followed by
French inspectors, trying to trap a double agent, Coronel Ricciotti Garibaldi, one of the grandsons of the
nineteenth-century hero. Playing on the republican tradition of the Garibaldini, favorable to the cause of
national and social self-determination, and open to Italian syndicalists and "libertarians" who did not
enjoy the rigidities of socialists and communists, Ricciotti had created a postwar movement for veterans,
Italia Libera, without great success on the growing left-right divide58. Transferring his base to France and
the Italian economic emigration there, Ricciotti had established a neo-Garibaldi movement, called the
"Legione della Libertà", which had been threatening to invade Italy since 1924. Placing unwonted
confidence in masonic connections, he became involved in a complicated game with dissident Fascists,
the Italian police, and Italian anarchists in Paris, Marseille and Nice, but also with French intelligence,
and, not surprisingly, he was eventually caught out. There were striking similarities of style, strategy and
intent between Ricciotti Garibaldi's movement and Macià's, the main difference being that the Catalan
operation -whatever other limitations it might have had- was in earnest. To cover the tracks of the
complicated dealings of their own security services, French authorities had Macià and Garibaldi (as well
as some of Macià's lieutenants) tried together in a single trial in January 1927, on the charge of illegal
possession of arms, on which judgment was a done deal59. Nevertheless, with official connivance, Macià
was able to turn, first, his arrest, and, later, his trial defense into a public relations triumph, announcing
that he wanted to create a " Pyrenean Belgium", an eternal friend of France.
Expelled to Brussel , as had been the rest of his "soldiers", Macià found himself without direct
contact with Catalonia and he projected a long trip in 1928 through the Catalan communities in America.
During this time the weight of the EC activities was in Catalonia, in the "Directori Interior", which up to
that moment had been even more than secondary, almost inactive. In the measure that a "constitutionalist"
dynamic had by then started up in opposition to Primo, capable of uniting liberals, republicans,
syndicalists and even conservatives, the interior directory in Barcelona, under the leadership of Dr. Jaume
Aiguader (also a "double militant" in the USC) tied the radical nationalists, as a party, into this process, as
it established habits of collaboration with both republicans like Companys or with anarchosyndicalists.
The new center of gravity of the organization became clear when Macià tried to carry out the agreement
reached in 1928 with the "Catalans d'Amèrica"60. As the overseas entities were characterized by a
permanently unrealistic perspective, they had drawn up a detailed constitution for Catalonia as well as
imposing a reorganization of Estat Català as the "Partit Separatista Revolucionari de Catalunya", with a
new intercontinental organization. The EC leader found, however, that the interior directory refused these
measures, considered as absurd, an attitude shared by the émigré leadership in Belgium. As a result,
Macià simply watched while Aiguader made the decisions. Soon, under the Berenguer government in
1930, Estat Català could act legally as the "Amics de Macià". But the leader could not support the
dullness of exile and reappeared in Barcelona in September 1930, to be sent back to Brussels by the
police, until, with the Aznar cabinet in 1931, he definitively returned home.
Estat Català now appeared without any clear definition as a party, but with the prestige of having
been almost the only force (except for the anarchists and anarchosyndicalists) to have fought against the
Dictatorship from the very beginning. The search for allies by the "Friends of Macià" was clearly part of a
unifying trend on the Catalan left, converging since the beginning of 1930. Consequently, EC entered,
together with the PRC, and many other opinion clubs and smaller groups, to form Esquerra Republicana
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de Catalunya (ERC) in a convention held in March 1931. Although nobody particularly thought so at the
time, the real strength of the new Esquerra came precisely from the the multiplicity of its myriad
component parts, which, a month later, gave it an unexpectedly easy victory in Barcelona and throughout
Catalonia in the municipal elections to initiate political normalization after the Dictatorship61. So stunning
was the triumph, that, two days after the voting, on April 14, Lluís Companys, head of the old PRC and
now mayor-elect of Barcelona for Esquerra, proclaimed the Republic from the town hall balcony as a
revolutionary act (he had CNT backing). He was soon followed by Macià who announced a "Catalan
Republic" and an "Iberian Confederation". What seemed little more than a provocation stuck, the
monarchical governmentof admiral Aznar backed away from repression, and the Republic became fact in
the late afternoon in Madrid.
The ERC was a product of the changes in Catalan society during the previous decade, as well as
of the prestige garnered by Estat Català as a visible resistance to the Dictatorship62. However, t e
Garibaldian revolutionary model refurbished by EC and shared with the more action-prone anarchist
groups remained in the minds of the latter and would guide their persistent attempts to pressure both
Catalan and  Spanish politics over the next few years63. Certainly, the sustained validity of Macià's
experience was also perceived by the Italian exiles of "Giustizia i Libertà" who saw the appearance of the
Spanish Republic with great hopes and, for a time, pinned their expectations on the continued efforts of
the nationalist-syndicalist alliance of Macià and the anarchists. Macià's failure to head a broad
revolutionary wave through Portugal and Italy was, for the anarchist leader Buenaventura Durruti, a
major disappointment which brought on his break with the Republic64.
A populism, like Latin America?
Esquerra Republicana was successful beyond all imagining, certainly incomparably so by the
lights of similar Spanish-scale republican parties65. In fact, what Macià, somewhat by accident, came to
produce and lead was a full-blown populism, far more intense in scale and intensity than any comparative
republican (as opposed to "workerist") political equivalent66. In ideological terms, populism would be any
movement with claims to be able to access the popular will better than exisiting representative institutions
(including the entities of the private sector). The Generalitat established under Macià in April 1931 was
merely de facto, not de jure, and would remain so until the end of 1932, with, first, parliamentary
approval for the Autonomy Statute, and, second, the Catalan elections which established a Catalan
chamber and responsible government at a regional level. As an apparently logical consequence, this
meant that the new Catalan political system was tainted by a certain easy fondness for any argument that
linked the generic idea of a People to the specific reality of a government, regardless of the fine points of
constitutional law. Furthermore, the introduction into a narrow political space of the illusion of forever
"jumping over" impediments had, in addition, a perverse effect, as it reset the conditioning limits of
Catalan politics for a considerable period. A weakness for direct appeal to "the Catalan masses" in the
face of any contradiction, and a penchant for returning to the magical formula of the 14 of April as an
ever-renewable starting-point, were to become the core values of "macianism", inspiring a certain
recklessness in Catalan political leadership which would have dire results67. Last but not least, the new
republican electoral law gave the ERC an absolute majority in Catalan representation at Spanish level
and, in the regional elections of November 1932, an absolute majority in the new Catalan Parliament.
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The total effect, therefore, was that of a quasi-single governmental party awash in the enthusiasm
of a mass movement, certainly a thrilling spectacle according to the new political taste of the 1930s. The
elderly Macià generated an intense "personality cult", which an observer like the leftist German
playwright-poet Ernst Toller compared to Hindenburg and Masaryk68. With hindsight, it would be facile
to make the analogy with the populist party-movements of the late 1930s and the 1940s in Latin America:
recently, when challenged on the similarity between Perón and Mussolini, Mario Firmenich, head of the
"Montonero" guerrillas in Argentina in the 1970s, preferred to say that, insofar as "peronism" was "a
movement of a popular nationalist cut", the true resemblance was between Perón and Macià69. Give  the
scant articulation of the early Vargas movement in Brazil, the equally rough state of the inheritance of
Calles in Mexico, and the divisions patent in the 1933 Cuban revolution, the question would be to what a
degree "macianism" in Barcelona was, if not a model, at least an antecedent to later developments in the
Americas70. But, instead of being a direct expression of this model of populism, Catalan radical
nationalism would act as its major internal contradiction.
Macià's radical nationalist movement, fused into the Esquerra, became the Joventuts d'Esquerra
Republicana-Estat Català (JEREC), a clumsy name that denoted the complications involved. More than in
the Sans Conference that led to the foundation of the ERC in March 1931, the origin of the JEREC
derived from the "order service", under Miquel Badia, who, the 14th of April and days following, took
control of the building housing the "Catalan Republic". At that time there was talk of a Catalan
Republican Civic Guard, an initiative that was backed by all the nationalist leaders in favor of armed
struggle, like Cardona, Josep Maria Batista i Roca or Ricard Fages. With the establishment of the
Generalitat on April 17, Macià suppressed the idea of a Catalan armed force -which had been the central
thesis of the historic Estat Català-,  fact that provoked the fury of the ultra-catalanists on the right and
left. Taking advantage of the new situation, Badia became the most militant follower of "macianism". As
a youngster, he had formed part of the "Serra del Cadí" group, and was tortured for his part in the failed
Garraf attempt, a guarantee of future prestige. In the summer of 1931, Badia allied politically with Dr.
Josep Dencàs (who, with other dissidents of Acció Republicana, had led a small Unió d'Esquerres
Catalanes into the ERC); together they were the alliance of "action" nationalists faithful to Macià with
younger and ambitious "politicans" that lacked catalanist credentials71. As unhappy nationalist militants
began breaking off from the ERC and reclaiming the name of Estat Català as an image of purity, Badia
and Dencàs marked off, as their political priority, youth organizing for the Catalan governmental party, an
option ignored by its republican "families"72.
With the JEREC under their control, the new nationalist team created an alternative power base
to that of the historical leaders of EC closer to Macià -such as Aiguader, the mayor of Barcelona, or
Ventura Gassol, the culture councillor of the Generalitat- who were not interested in creating a nationalist
infrastructure in the ERC itself. During 1932, Badia made the JEREC grow, multiplying centers or
installing members in formations of other sectors, although neither he nor Dencàs received Macià's
explicit support, so that there were groups allied with the party youth that were outside their control, such
as the Barcelona center La Falç, the Joventut Republicana de Lleida, or very small associations with press
ressonance, like Pàtria Nova. In 1933, before the transfer of "public services" from the central
government to the Generalitat, Badia established close ties with the existing police corps and backed
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strong "gangbusting" action against anarchist terrorism, both in his official capacity (in December he was
the general secretary of the Public Order Commissariat, and then in March of 1934 was named Head of
Services within the Department of "Governació", the Interior office of the Catalan government) and using
the more informal methods of his "escamots". Dencàs, councillor of Health and Social Assistance since
January 1933, became known as an efficient reformer. The mutual opportunity of the two came in
September, with the exclusion from the ERC of the "L'Opinió Group". This sealed the downfall of Josep
Tarradellas, who, from December 1931 to January 1933, had been councillor of "Governació", in charge
of relations with the public order forces. A part of the ERC youth, including republicans (the Joventut
Esquerrista, identified by the press campaigns of its spokesmen against Dencàs and Badia), that had been
demanding its own formation within the governmental party followed "L'Opinió Group" into a new Partit
Nacionalista Republicà d'Esquerra (PNRE).
In the measure that Macià was criticized, both from outside the ERC as well as from inside, he
relied on the nationalist youth, a circumstance that the JEREC squads used both to attack his critics
(damage to the printers of the satirical weekly El B  Negre) and to make a political fashion statement of
sorts and appear uniformed and "militarized" (in a parade, on Sunday October 22, in which the
"escamots" marched in olive shirts and single-star flag armbands from their numerous centers in the city
up to the Olympic Stadium on Montjuic hill). The political reaction to this parade was enormous, with all
manner of aspersions regarding "Catalan fascism" being cast about in the Barcelona newspapers,
especially since elections for the Spanish parliament were only weeks away, in mid-November. The
anarchosyndicalist publications logically made much of the "danger", but the Esquerra's many electoral
enemies (including the new PNRE's L'Opinió) were equally harsh. The scandal even made it to the
Madrid press, where in particular the rightist dailies gleefully howled with calculated indignation at this
alleged paramilitary threat. ERC's electoral partner, the Unió Socialista de Catalunya, threatened a
division if the youth groups were not dismantled. The reaction was so strong that, on December 3, an
extraordinary national assembly of the JEREC formally dissolved the "shock groups" (as they were
called), although in reality nothing changed73. The furor set off by the parade in uniform fixed forever
more the image of a "Catalan fascism". In reality, however, "shirt corps" were the stuff of 1930s politics
everywhere, regardless of ideology74. In Spain all the "worker" left -the Socialist Youth, the Communist
Youth, the BOC (with its GABOC, or "Grups d'Acció del BOC")- had uniformed "shock groups", armed
when possible, and also carried out shootings and similar actions, which by no means were a monopoly of
the radical right. The question, therefore, was one of demonization: if paramilitary forces and private
armies were common across the board, why did the tarbrush mark the extreme right as exceptional? A
possible reply might be that while leftist parties might share a common fashion with the radicalized right,
such a question of style, however relevant, was nonetheless not essential to their political identity; on the
contrary, "fascist" groups could not publicly distinguish themselves from exalted conservatives without
the recourse to a defining style.
Macià's death, on Christmas Day 1933, was excellently timed for the internal politics of the
ERC, permitting a rearrangement: Dencàs disapproved of Macià's emblematic assistant, the poet Ventura
Gassol, as nationalist candidate for the presidency, and accordingly gave his support to Companys, head
of the republican wing of the governmental party, in exchange for being recognized in turn as head of a
fullfledged party group, with the same organizational rank in the Catalan government as the leader of a
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party. As Companys wanted to reincorporate the different parties that up to then had been in opposition to
Macià's leadership, this was an easy concession, especially as the new president accepted the JEREC as
an ERC presence in rural areas to balance the possible excesses of organized farmers ("rabassaires") or
counteract "national-communist" influence in the urban service sector exemplified by the CADCI75. The
JEREC also acted as civic protection, to guarantee minimum service, in the Barcelona transport strike of
December 1933. With heavy membership among secondary school and university students in Barcelona,
the JEREC's cited figures of around ten thousand affiliates. Thus, the JEREC benefited both from the
presence of Badia as Public Order Commissar and that of Dencàs temporarily in "Governació", after the
untimely death at the end of June 1934 of Joan Selves (come over to ERC from Acció Catalana) and
Tarradellas' successor, who had kept in check ultra-nationalist ambitions over the police.
In short, the JEREC seemed ready to utilize its pr viledged position to impose its specific agenda
on Catalan society, and, perhaps, even on a Spanish political situation quite recalcitrant with the
"separatist threat". During 1934 and especially with the dismal result of the revolution on October 6,
Catalan radical nationalism snatched defeat from imagined victory, wiped away in one night the
reputation gained against Primo de Rivera, and won for itself a new reputation as a bluff.
Irish and Basque translations for an exclusivist, hardline nationalism
Not surprisingly, Macià's alliance with the ultraleft, his espousal of a Spanish (or even Iberian)
revolution and his triumphant emergence as the head of a broad-based and populist governmental party
which controlled the offically-recognized Catalan sub-political system under the new Republic in April
1931, provoked bitter dissidence from the purists of separatism. There remained the hope that a policy of
catalanist unity could achieve a less slanted political setup or give the anarchosyndicalists less leeway.
Thus, conservative radical nationalists looked to a transversal alliance that would join the nationalist wing
of ERC with the old Lliga, now the major opposition to "macianism", and pull together the dispersed
ultra-catalanist groupings of the left and the right to form a powerful new alternative to the "Spanishness"
of the republican situation, facilitating a renewed connection with Basque and Galician nationalists and
bringing about the eventual breakup of the Spanish State or, at the very least, a confederate system76.
Macià played an explicitly dualistic policy within the Republic, and implicitly ignored the possibilities of
a three-way nationalist coalition77. This, however, gave his Lliga opponents the opportunity to intrigue
with both Catalan nationalist groupings and with the Basques and Galicians against the ERC. The press of
the Esquerra played the conservative nature of the Lliga to the hilt, hinting openly that the old regionalist
party (systematically portrayed in cartoons as a worn-out whore) was the equivalent of fascism, an idea to
which the socialists and nationalist communists were logically quite amenable78. In truth, Joan Estelrich,
Cambó's righthand man, had led a broad ideological operation in Spanish politics, which ultimately failed
for a number of reasons, but which led to a clear communication of Catalan nationalist ideas being
inoculated into the future heart of Spanish fascism though the active partipation of the first and most
outstanding ideologue of the latter movement, Ernesto Giménez Caballero, in the Lliga initiative79. The
bitter fact was, however, that Cambó's "imperial" ideas (expressed in his 1929 book Por la concordia) for
a greater Hispano-Catalan understanding (including the "Iberianist" hope for the ultimate integration of
Portugal) were effectively adopted, without a nod (quite the contrary), by the ERC-USC in 1931-1932,
and the Lliga was condemned to play simultaneously with the Spanish monarchists, and, in complete
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contradiction, with non-Catalan nationalists, all at the same time80. At home, the Lliga found much of its
thunder stolen by the upstart Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC), a nationalist christian-democratic
party formed in late 1931 by the fusion of dissident carlists and catholics from Acció Catalana81. Within
ultra-catalanism, a new cultural entity, Palestra, established in April 1930 by Josep Maria Batista i Roca,
bridged the common space between the JEREC, the ultra-nationalist right, the UDC, Acció Catalana and
the Lliga, while linking the Boy Scout movement with action groups82.
The outstanding anti-"macianist" within radical nationalism was doubtlessly Cardona. With the
liberalization and the end of Dictatorhip under the government of general Berenguer in 1930, Cardona
returned to Catalonia and formed a initial group, called L'Estel, which soon gave way, in September, to
the Agrupació Nacionalista Nosaltres Sols! (NS!), a name which purported to be the literal translation of
the Irish Sinn Féin. Although Cardona, like other radical nationalists (Batista i Roca, Fages), joined in
support of Macià's short-lived "Catalan Republic" in April 1931, hoping that the Civic Guard then
purportedly being recruited would be the beginning of the long-awaited "Liberation Army", he was
violently disappointed -for the last time, he decided- when once again the EC leader refused to carry out
the "Irish strategy" he himself had for so long sustained. From then on, Nosaltres Sols! became the
expression of the most irreducible anti-"macianism". Just as in the days of exile, Cardona defended
apoliticism (understanding by this no ideological divisions in the cause of independence) and a unitary
insurreccional position seen in a rather imaginary Irish light. Cardona himself, independent of means
through the inheritance of land in Sant Just Desvern (then a village outside Barcelona), was not loath to
participate in elections, and was voted mayor of his adopted town in 1931 and again in 1934. His
movement, centered in the Baix Llobregat, had a considerable pull on young men in a broad suburban
area, and, though there were no more than a few hundred militants at any given time, the number of
"lads" ("nois") who passed through NS! on their way to other nationalist destinations was probably far
higher. In any case, many separatists, like Cardona, were convinced of the need to battle Macià in his own
terrain, while they prepared for the great push to independence.
Perhaps influenced by the Basque example (the Partido Nacionalista Vasco [PNV] was reunited
in 1ate 1930, with a left minority split, reorganized as Acción Nacionalista Vasca) and perhaps perversely
influenced by the fact that Macià refused to sustain an alliance with either of the Basque organizations,
diverse strands of Catalan radical nationalism, unwilling to accept the marriage of separatism and
republicanism put forth by the ERC, decided to create their own electoral organization. The formation of
a Partit Nacionalista Català (PNC) was announced simultaneously with the creation of Elements d'Estat
Català (EEC) in July 1931. This last was a platform set up by those especially irritated by the political
deals of the ERC and the "sell out" of the Autonomy Statute presided over by Macià. As a sign of the
break, the new EEC was headed by Josep Casals i Freixes, a tailor who had been the treasurer for the
clandestine interior directory of EC under the Dictatorship83. A few months later, in March 1932, various
dissident nationalist entities, including EEC, NS!, the husk of the old Unió Catalanista and a "Secció
Ferroviària d'Estat Català" formally unveiled the PNC as an explicitly nationalist party which presumably
could overcome the deficiencies, on the right, of the Lliga and Acció Catalana, and, on the left, of
hegemonic "macianism". The new party had a strong catholic component, given that the formation of the
PNC had run parallel to the creation of the christian-democratic UDC and many of the PNC's components
came from catholic youth leagues, and the PNC's most outstanding intellectual, the ex-Lliga jurist
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Francesc Maspons i Anglasell, was publicly devout84. But there was something of a mix, since Casals was
a leading freemason.
For whatever reasons, internal squabbling soon had a deleterious effect, and most of the
founding organizations, such as NS! and the Unió Catalanista discretely distanced themselves from the
PNC, which nevertheless benefited from the usual habit of multiple militancy or informality in afiliation:
it remained an electoral platform in a political space characterized by projects for ambitious and ever
unfinished platforms for insurrection or civic protest. In any case, the PNC formally reestablished itself in
January 1933. The party line was a well-worn rebuttal of Macià's alleged "sectarianism", and a rejection
of the autonomy sustained by the Catalan government (according to which Catalonia should remain as an
exceptional sub-State within the Spanish republican framework).
As its name indicated, the PNC was at least in part a homage to the example of the PNV; as a
direct consequence, the PNC defended Catalan solidarity with Basque and Galician revindications. Given
this position, the PNC tended towards a certain approximation with the Lliga and the UDC, even with the
most nationalist sector of the reorganized Acció Catalana Republicana, all of which equally criticized the
lack of ERC sensitivity on religious questions and the absence of sympathy with other the hispanic
nationalisms, a convergence visible in the "Galeuzca" proposal which dominated anti-"macianista"
nationalist energies during 193385. Although this was not its purpose in a Spanish context, "Galeuzca", in
Catalan politics, was primarily directed against the republican sector of ERC, and to that purpose some
discontented nationalists within "macianism" were prominent in the meetings that surrounded the
operation. Mutual imitations between Catalan and Basque nationalists were full of contradictions86. The
success of Macià was obviously stunning, as was his reluctance to offer support to other analogous
movements; but, in Catalonia, radical nationalists with eccentric ambitions could look to extremist
currents within Basque and Galician nationalism for inspiration and the hope of external backing for a
blocked internal situation87. O ly Cardona, however, systematically looked beyond Spanish borders, with
the Mordrel wing of Breton nationalism88.
In part due to its political line, the PNC never had success with voters, neither in the elections to
the Parliament of Catalonia in November 1932 (when it presented a candidacy for the Barcelona-city
district, its only satisfaction being getting ten times the result of the left separatists), nor in the Catalan
municipal elections of January 1934. The PNC's electoral difficulties derived largely from its lack of
attractive leadership: Maspons, its most distinguished intellectual, was a pedant, not at all adequate to the
ordeal of "pressing the flesh". The true initiator of the party, the engineer Manuel Massó i Llorens, in
Acció Catalana before the Dictatorship and a pronounced enemy of Macià in exile, turned up in
Barcelona in 1931, put about the idea of an anti-Macià nationalist party in a published lecture, and then
returned to his career in Argentina. Massó was not the only dissident anti-"macianista" who preferred
emigration among the "Catalans d'Amèrica", despite the fact that their ultra-catalanist associations, with
their nostalgic purism, had been swept from the limelight they briefly enjoyed in the 1920s89.
The electoral discredit of the PNC gave the initiative within the party to younger activists, ea r
to collaborate with the more or less secret paramilitary sector (led by the Germanophile Fages), with
Cardona's OMNS or with the OrMiCa (Organització Militar Catalana) that Batista i Roca kept hidden
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under Palestra90. This same pressure meant that by 1934 Cardona's leadership within Nosaltres Sols! was
being questioned. More explicitly ideological tendencies appeared. A pro-German tendency, headed by
Manuel Blasi, came to have contacts with local Auslands Organisation-NSDAP officials on an informal
basis (such as joint training exercises), which eventually gave way to more ambitious feelers. This was
balanced by an Italianophile orientation, led by Baldomer Palazón, which had similar relations with the
Italian Consulate in Barcelona, but, it would seem, not much more in the way of a political relationship.
Thus, Irish and Basque analogies kept the right-wing portion of Catalan radical nationalism on the edge of
democratic respectability, without making the full leap to the Italian model, always thinking of a future
Catalan democracy purged of unacceptable immigrants and revolutionaries, anticipating a unity born of
independence which would be in all ways superior to the confused and shabby populism of Macià, his
successor Companys, and the ERC. Extremely uncomfortable with idealizations of the State, which
always have abounded in Spanish political thinking, Catalan separatists, no matter how rightist, tended to
re-imagine power as a utopia in the familiar forms of civil society, since dreaming the achievement of
independence was more emotionally gratifying than thinking about what came later.
Alsatian and French analogies: a Communism of the Right?
The reorganization of Estat Català in Belgium in 1927, in the wake of the Prats de Molló affair,
and its reconversion into a very hypothetical Partit Separatista Revolucionari de Catalunya, supposed to
bridge the intercontinental distances between the nationalist exile, the Catalan economic emigration to the
Americas and the underground interior directory in Catalonia, set off all manner of complaints. While the
infrastructure in Barcelona did as it considered best, the leadership in European exile, backed by some
influential militants who managed to remain in France (notably Jaume Miravitlles) or who tried their luck
in Mexico (Rovira), showed their discomfort by a series of ideological critiques. Their growing irritation
at the allegedly conservative influence of the "Catalans of America" on Macià made them lend an ear to
the rhetoric on national self-determination that the Communist International was insisting on during the
stalinist turn of 1927-1928. As the exiles returned in 1930-1931, these protest themes took the form of a
discourse of disillusionment with Macià. Nevertheless, the separatist leader did achieve a hypothetical
"Catalan Republic" under his presidency on April 14, soon converted into a Catalan autonomous
government, called thereafter the Generalitat. The attacks from the left on "macianism" and its betrayal of
the cause, during the summer and fall of 1931, hardened into an open break: the president of the new
autonomy was charged for his failure to achieve independence and carry out a "revolution". Accordingly,
a part of the more youthful EC militancy (exemplified by Miravitlles), together with a larger group of
sympathizers then gravitated towards the Catalan communist grouping the Bloc Obrer i Camperol (BOC).
Another sector preferred to gather around the symbolic figure of Jaume Compte, a brave if rather
inexpressive and inept travelling salesman, and a hero to radical nationalists for resisting torture after the
1925 Garraf attempt. Now, this rather simpleminded purist denounced the abandonment of the old Estat
Català program, and the entry into Macià's ERC of Spanish, as opposed to Catalan, republicans91.
The BOC was by far the more serious option: in 1929, the Federació Comunista Catalano-
Balear, the largest territorial base of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), split off from party and
Komintern discipline (in practice, rule through the French party delegates) and established itself as an
independent organization. The move, a response to the weak, doctrinaire leadership of the PCE, was led
23
by a former syndicalist, Joaquim Maurín, with a certain ideological flair (he would be by the far the most
original marxist analyst of Spanish affairs before the Civil War, a limited compliment)92. In arxist-
leninist hermeneutics, the fledgling party was "right-wing deviationist", a "bukharinist" option and, for a
time, even had relations with the Right Opposition of Jay Lovestone93. But Maurín had an intellectual
solidity that paled the other homegrown marxists in Barcelona. A small Partit Comunista Català (PCC),
set up in 1928, with service sector workers (the bellicose Jordi Arquer) and a syndical presence (the
Sindicat Mercantil, expelled from the CNT) was accordingly absorbed, except for some dissidents94.
Maurín's only serious challenge was from Andreu Nin, a former nationalist schoolteacher who became
anarchosyndicalist, and then, by accident, a Soviet functionary in Russian exile with close personal ties to
Trotsky. As personal advantages, Nin had his direct anointment at the hands of the "Prophet" and a good
knowledge of Russian (he was an excellent translator of Russian literature), but his political arguments
were stereotyped and stale; the official trotskyite Izquierda Comunista under his leadership had a tiny
following of righteous devotees95. The BOC, thus, was able to keep expanding, with pretensions to
intellectualism, enjoying its role as the political delegation of French surrealism in 1931 (Dalí was,
briefly, the BOC's most peculiar "fellow traveller")96. But adical nationalists and nationalist-communists
of all stripes shared a common conviction -however vague on specifics- n the capacity of Barcelona's
service workers of acting as leading "technicians" in a revolutionary change, be that a readjustment of
Catalonia's industrial base or a deeper freedom beyond autonomy.
With the conviction born of Leninist certainty, the BOC had staked out its expectation of a major
presence in Catalonia in the April municipal elections which brought the downfall of the Monarchy. But,
like so many other forces, it was swept aside by the populist success of "macianism" and the ERC,
retaining only local points of support outside Barcelona, in Girona (Figueres, Banyoles) or the Lleida
countryside97. Nevertheless, the BOC was perceived as a national-communist alternative to the vague
"national-socialism" of the ERC and its electoral ally the USC98. As the "negative satellite" of the ERC
implicit single-party system to the USC's "positive satellite", the BOC was therefore in a position to
attract all those nationalist militants who, as they became "ideologically conscious", could be tempted by
a mild leninism around a strong nationalist position: the BOC was the last to abandon the symbolic
"Catalan Republic" of April 1931 (not counting the extreme ultra-catalanists on the right), and was
believed by all to be most sincere in its espousal of a "Union of Socialist Iberian Republics", then the
standard marxist-leninist solution to Spain's national/regional divisions, as all communists firmly
sustained that the Soviet Union had forever solved the "national question" (including the trotskists; Nin
wrote a book about it)99. At the same time, however, the BOC expected to become a Spanish organization
and, thus, challenged the primacy of the almost non-existent PCE.
Aware of the potential for attracting anarchosyndicalists and nationalists, and incensed by the
success of a non-authorized communist party, the Komintern took note of the Catalans, attuned as it was
to minority questions100. Having redesigned the leadership of the Spanish flagship party (mixing Basques
like Dolores Ibarruri, later "La Pasionaria", and Andalusians, like the general-secretary, José Díaz) and
lessened French influence, Moscow attempted to create its own reply to the BOC on its Catalan turf and
in the Basque Country. The stalinist effort in Catalonia reflected distress at the roots put forth by Maurín's
party, as well as the obsession of the distant Soviet chief with any hint of Trotsky: in 1932, when a Partit
Comunista de Catalunya (PC de C) was set up, its nominal similarity to the PCC of 1928 was evident.
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Formally independentist (but not terribly convincing: Catalu ya roja, its weekly mouthpiece, was only
Catalan in its title, being written entirely in Spanish), this new PC de C was headed, in an effort to erase
Nin's exile chic, by Ramón Casanellas, a former CNT terrorist who fled to Russia and became a Red
Army pilot. The PC de C was small and paranoid (Casanellas' death in a motorcycle accident led to
endless insistence on a murder plot) but it had the option -giv n the Komintern's "class against class"
strategy- of leftism and self-determination, with which to counter the BOC's ambiguous "national-
communism"101. In the meantime, the BOC, convinced in its "correct" positions, waited for the masses to
abandon the ERC and join its fold, counting on a vanguard of radical nationalists, freed of their "petit
bourgeois" errors.
But, in parallel to the BOC and to the stalinist imitation thereof, a significant portion of the
radical nationalists evolved, on their own, towards "national-communism". During September-October
1931, the mix of disillusioned separatists around Compte gathered up the strands of anti-imperialist
rhetoric of the late separatist exile, and "refounded" Estat Català, but added the trailer "Força Separatista
d'Extrema Esquerra" for greater defintion. This new EC(FSEE) picked up various small grouplets that did
not feel the attraction of the BOC. In a first phase, during 1931-1932, EC(FSEE) seemed capable of
expansion, but its progressive "marxistization" scared away more moderate nationalists, like Pàtria Lliure,
a coalition of local entities in Barcelona and L'Hospitalet. As the anticommunists abandoned Compte, the
effect favored Cardona, even though some of the dissidents, also with various centers in Barcelona and
L'Hospitalet, defined themselves as Estat Lliure, presumably -in Irish terms, confusing from a catalanist
standpoint- a far distance from his "Ourselves Alone" position. Having nowhere else to go, however, they
came to some arrangement.
The EC(FSEE) relied on the weekly L'insurgent, starting in April of 1932 and lasting until the
party's bid in the Catalan elections that autumn. The platform garnered the support of prestigious militants
returned from America, like Josep Rovira, incorporations that brought with them interest in a more
ambitious reorganization of the party. At the first congress, in October 1932, the group was renamed Estat
Català-Partit Proletari (EC-PP) and, with this label, it presented itself to the Catalan parliamentary
elections in November 1932, with Compte at the head of the list. But Compte's evident political
incapacity (many of his articles were ghostwritten, even by Arquer of the BOC) and the lack of popularity
of his leftist anti-"macianism", always better articulated by the BOC, led to ridiculous results for EC-PP.
After the elections, leading figures -Josep Rovira, Miquel Ferrer- d serted for the BOC.
As a result, the EC-PP gravitated towards friendly relations with the newly founded PC de C.
Together with the stalinist group, the EC-PP created a "Minoria d'Oposició Mercantil" that in 1933 acted
against the pro-ERC leadership in the CADCI, until the alliance managed to take it over in the summer of
1934. Even before this success of the united "Shopworkers' Opposition", the pro-stalinist stance led to a
redefinition of the nationalist party, when, at the beginning of 1934, it abandoned the old trademark of
"Estat Català" to become the Partit Català Proletari (PCP). The PCP enthusiastically backed the
"antifascist" insurrection that October. From CADCI headquarters, the PCP actively opposed army units,
which resulted in the building being hit by cannonfire, with the consequent death of the party's leaders
(Compte, Manuel Gonzàlez i Alba)102.
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For some months after the October 1934 revolt, during the summer of 1935, the BOC had a
warm relationship with Doriot, quickly distancing itself, with acute embarassment, when doriotism turned
right, just as the BOC turned left and merged with Nin's trotskists to form the new Partit Obrer
d'Unificació marxista (POUM), in September 1935103. But the interest in such "mixed" initiatives as De
Man's plan, the French neo-socialists or even doriotism remained alive in such ex-EC, ex-BOC activists
like Miravitlles, by then firmly in the ERC104. In any case, in marked contrast to Spain, neo-jacobinism
became a theme of the French Communist Party (PCF) as the Popular Front pulled together. The PCF had
enjoyed a virtual proxy holding on the Spanish Party in the 1920s and would be active in convincing a
reluctant Stalin to intervene in Spain in 1936105.
There was more than a whiff of "nationalist deviationism" in the BOC and in its "nationalist-
marxist" rivals, which resembled the initial evolution of Alsatian Communism, split-off in the mid-1930s
with a apparently similar "Elsaßische Arbeiter- und Bauernpartei" before becoming openly pro-Nazi. But
the structural difference with the notorious Alsatian case was the absence of a sympathetic foreign power
with "irredentist" ambitions -such as Germany in relation to France- which might back an "oppressed
nationalism"106. There was no clear outside support: Catalonia was too far away to be more than a
curiosity for the Germans was too risky an option for France, which preferred a weak Spain to a Pyrenean
fragmentation that might threaten its own internal unity; and the the Italians, given to Mediterranean
adventures, might consider the catalanists an option (and a way of keeping tabs on Italian antifascist
exiles), but that interest would be secondary to any Spanish nationalism that seemed philo-fascist107.
A National Front or a Popular Front?
Companys, as president of the Generalitat, gave a general leftward spin to "macianist" populism.
This repositioning of the ERC forcibly meant a closer, even more ideological approximation to the
Spanish left, which was now out of power because of its own divisions, and accordingly was groping
towards some sort of reunification built on bitter mutterings about "the rise of fascism" within the
Republic108. Given its leftism, the Catalan regional autonomy became increasingly an exception in
European politics, parallel only to Léon Nicole's socialist administration of Geneva, after the elections of
November 1933 in the Swiss canton109. C mpanys' election to the regional presidency was duly noted by
the French left as a positive beginning to 1934, in the face of the "February crises" in Paris and Vienna110.
International repercussions, local categories, and the verities of Spanish affairs, therefore, kept Catalan
nationalists on a clear left track.
During the 1934 constitutional crisis between the left government in Barcelona and the center-
right cabinet in Madrid, the JEREC had an important role as armed backup for the Generalitat: for a start,
they disarmed the Somatent (traditional citizen guards) during the summer, assuring, in theory, a supply
of carbines. At the same time, with the excuse of the crisis, the JEREC under Dencàs and Badia wanted to
impose some sort of "National Front" on all the other radical nationalist parties. Thus, for example, the
last significant appearance of the PNC took place in the tense summer of 1934, as a spur to the dominant
position of the ERC nationalist wing. The exalted tone of the PNC's weekly organ, La Nació Catalana,
led to a sedition trial for its editor, and increasingly more scandalous incidents in succeeding trials were
provoked by defense lawyer Josep Maria Xammar, who became the party's protagonist. In early
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September, during the trial of Xammar for contempt, some JEREC members caused an "incident" in the
Barcelona Palace of Justice, which led to Badia immediately losing his position as Public Order
Comissioner, and, further, to a nasty personal break with president Companys. In the decisive moment of
the Madrid-Barcelona crisis, with the Generalitat a "bulwark" in a wide left coalition against "fascism"
(i.e., the entry of CEDA into the central government), Dencàs was playing against Companys as much as
against events in Madrid, and the BOC, with its "Workers'Alliance" of leftist parties and syndicates, was
at best a purely theoretical ally. The Dencàs-Badia reply to both Companys and the populist coalition that
backed him, and to BOC pressure outside the Catalan government, was a stance of nationalist unity. But
the JEREC attempt to put all the paramilitary nationalists -OMNS, OrMiCa, the PNC "boys"- under their
control in a National Front of Youth Groups, did not work. The result in the October revolt was a
confused, passive response by the "escamots" and other nationalist "militias", with a consequent loss of
image, emphasized by the fact that Dencàs was the only councillor that fled arrest, to go into exile with
Badia111. PNC militants, for example, played no visible role in October, and their party virtually
disappeared, reduced by left-right polarization. The "escamots", on the other hand, had adquired a
reputation for "terrorism", in large measure due to anarchosyndicalist counter-propaganda, which would
prove surprisingly lasting112.
The many sectors within the ERC in favor of Companys, or merely jealous of the two nationalist
leaders, orchestrated a campaign to accuse them of the failure of the uprising. Different publications
began using the name of JEREC or of the "Front Nacional" and a delegation of an unspecified Estat
Català went to the first encounter held to explore ongoing "marxist unification" during 1935. The
nationalists, effectively leaderless and blamed by the jailed Companys for the defeat of the revolution,
became the natural social base for the expansion of all the communist parties. Catalan "frontpopulisme"
has been understood as a solid ideology113. Perhaps it was, but only as the continuation of Esquerra
populism, with considerable ambiguity regarding the ideological frontier between nationalism and
socialism.
If the "National Front" ideal had failed in 1934, the pressur  towards "marxist unification" or
even "working class unity" during 1935 left the Catalan radical nationalists displaced, having shot their
bolt, and with little potential or visible promise for fusion. Even Palestra had a split: a younger figure,
Andreu Xandri, set up a grouping of "cadres", called Club David, as a nucleus for the future114. The defeat
of the October 1934 revolt forced Nosaltres Sols! underground (Cardona exiled as usual in Perpignan).
Personal connections made the christian-democratic UDC offer protection by taking over at least one NS!
delegation to give it legal cover. This situation, in turn, led to splits within NS! Before the end of 1934 a
student section was created, the Bloc Escolar Nacionalista (BEN) soon outstanding for its extremism.
Similarly, a group of friends led by an architecture student, Jacint Goday i Prats, split off from NS! in the
spring and summer of 1935 to establish an ephimeral Moviment Nacionalista Totalitari (MNT), around a
short-lived weekly called Ferms!, possibly with some funding from the Italian Consulate in Barcelona115.
In the face of the Ethiopian crisis, the Italians were clearly spreading their options in Spanish politics, but
concrete information on their contacts with non-Spanish nationalists is hard to come by and indicates a
considerable informality in such relations116. While the MNT did not long survive, its original, even
striking rhetoric would remain alive in ultra-nationalist circles through the Civil War. The discussion of
the "totalitarian idea" was certainly alive in catalanism after 1934: a respected columnist like the poet J.V.
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Foix, known for his maurrasian logic, could explicitly put the term in circulation in 1931117. The UDC
toyed with the term before deciding it too dangerous. By 1935, the ultra-catalanist student union, the
BEN, was talking of a "Catalunya totalitària" that encompassed all the areas of Catalan speakers plus
Occitania118. Blasi, of the Germanophile sector of NS!, Batista i Roca, as well as some elements of the
JEREC, afraid of the increasing weight of the left, intensified their contacts with the German
representatives of some or other form, basically to sound out possibilities, although German interest in
Iberian affairs was scant119. Catalan separatists were nonetheless well aware, even that early, of the
demonizing nature of any Nazi link, and made extreme efforts to keep it quite secret; however
unrealistically, they remained pro-League of Nations, rather than favoring the overthrow of Anglo-French
"collective security". But, whatever the ideological excitements available in 1935-1936, radical
nationalists showed themselves incapable of any reunification without a previous breakup of the
nationalist wing of the ERC. There were rumors, during the general elections in February 1936, of a
"Nacionalist Front" being formed by the PNC, NS! and the UDC, but it came to nothing120.
Pro-communist nationalism was not any better off in 1935. The PCP was headless, little more
than a clandestine sheet, Catalunya insurgent, al hough it enjoyed the prestige of a virtual monopoly of
revolutionary martyrs from the previous October. Therefore, it played an important role as a bait of the
PC de C in the dynamic of unification of the marxist left in Catalonia, up to the point where its youth
section was pioneer, fusing with that of the USC to create the Joventut Socialista de Catalunya in January
1936. As a consequence of this process, the PCP was one of the founding parties of the Partit Socialista
Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC), the Catalan "unified socialists" constituted in July 1936 as a "party
adhered to the Communist International", even though its members did not achieve any particularly
relevant role as stalinists.
Numerous outstanding militants of the BOC, mostly of nationalist origin (like Ferrer), had been
unable to accept the merger with Nin's trotskists, and had bolted to the USC or other groups that
eventually ended up in the PSUC. Some iniciatives tried to take advantage of the space left in "strict"
radical nationalism by the openly marxist evolution of the PCP, as well as the disappearance of the BOC
into the new POUM, to offer milder alternatives. In January 1936, the Bloc Català Treballista (BTC) was
founded in Barcelona, of minor importance. Slightly more relevant was the Front Nacional Català
Proletari (FNCP), begun in December 1935 and formally established in March 1936, based in Barcelona
but with some militants in the Tarragona area. Its pro-labor and "national-revolutionary" leadership had
much experience being shunted aside in the different encarnations of Estat Català or were Catalan proto-
communists excluded from the BOC: all were opposed to the dynamic of socialist-stalinist-catalanist
unification121. Both the BTC and the FNCP disappeared with the start of revolution.
The creation of the POUM, embued with righteous leninism and dialectical superiority,
effectively cut off the nationalist link that the BOC had prospered on for so long. On the other hand, the
PSUC wisely acted as an embodiment of the "popular front" spirit (in Catalonia, with its specific political
sub-system, there was a Front d'Esquerres, distinct from the Spanish Frente Popular). Accordingly, under
revolutionary circumstances, the PSUC, as a "national-communism" picked up the slack left by the
radicalization of dissident communism and by the comparative breakdown of ERC as a broad, populist
party, deprived of its nationalist wing.
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A "national revolutionary party" adrift in social revolution
After the victory of the Left Front in the general el ctions of February 1936, where the "martyr
president" triumphed over the doubtful and "fascist" Dencàs and Badia, the return of the two nationalist
leaders signaled an aggressive break within the JEREC. In February-March 1936, nationalist partisans
were pressing for a necessary "purge" of the JEREC from their weekly Ara!! Th  JEREC desintegrated in
the spring of 1936, the latent conflict accelerating beyond all discretion after the assasination of Badia and
his brother by unknown assailants on April 28. It was open knowledge that CNT gunmen had carried out
the killing, but "falangistas" were officially arrested and accused, while nationalists "in the know" insisted
on the responsability of agents of president Companys, implicated for complex personal and political
reasons122. A few days later, Dencàs was outmaneuvered by Companys and his allies in the Catalan
Parliament and suffered official blame for the October 1934 defeat. This succession of events ripped apart
the nationalist wing of ERC. At the end of May, twin congresses were held by rival leaderships, one
faithful to the official party line while the other opted for a split and the creation of a new, unitary, radical
nationalist party, naturally called, yet again, Estat Català. A congress held on May 22-25 gave birth to the
new organization, and, during the following month, NS!, the PNC and other minor groupings joined.
With the bulk of radical nationalists coming together in an anti-Companys position, PNC militants had
behind-the-scenes influence and a role in the press of the new EC party. Without as much show,
numerous ultra-catalanist youth entities, such as Palestra or the student unions active in 1935-1936, also
came aboard or at least acted as satellites, always within the traditional nationalist custom of multiple
militancy.
As a reply, on May 26, diverse ERC spokesmen prompted a manifesto calling for a "Unifying
Comission" to redirect the JEREC, and turn the youth organization into something useful to the whole
governmental party. Two days later, loyalists to Companys within the JEREC held their own congress, as
proof of fidelity. In the measure that the PNRE re-entered ERC, its youth section was to incorporate itself
into the ERC Youth, as a sort of compensation, all to be confirmed by the similar congress of the ERC
itself, scheduled for July 18. Nevertheless, the whole business was remarkably short-lived, with events
hastened by the outbreak of war and revolution in mid-July. The new pro-Russian party, the Partit
Socialista Unificat de Catalunya (PSUC), formed officially on July 23, "stole" leading nationalist
republicans as well as part of the official JEREC, presenting itself as both catalanist and revolutionary123.
The organizers of the loyal JEREC bolted to the PSUC in early August, together with some of Companys'
personal assistants, previously aggressive opponents of "Catalan fascism"124.
Having broken with the ERC, unable to stand by itself, radical nationalism had to chose an ally
between anarchosyndicalism, which the JEREC had pressured in 1933-1934, and the new communist
parties in the making. The emotional background was ironically summed up by the British journalist John
Langdon-Davies, who had a working relation with Batista i Roca (and called him "Q." in his account):
Even Q. admits it: 'We catalans are such individualists that our philosophy runs to anarchism.
We will never submit to communism'. So say the F.A.I. and the C.N.T., though Q. would rather
that they did not.[...] They do not care, these F.A.I. and C.N.T., for the things that really
matter.[...] While good Catalans devote their energy to dedicating fountains to dead poets and
changing the Castillian notices in the streets into Catalan, the anarcho-syndicalists are otherwise
busy125.
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But the social breakdown of the nationalists -with the notorious predominance of service
workers- gave them a natural tendency towards the communists of either the PSUC or the POUM, with a
leadership of schoolteachers and publicists, many of them onetime nationalists themselves, as opposed to
the anarchists, often teachers, but in the unrecognized rationalist schools of the "libertarian" movement126.
Thus, EC was what the communists called a "national revolutionary party", a "petit bourgeois"
companion down the road to revolution127.
Estat Català, whatever the social underpinings, was immediately overwhelmed by the onset of
revolution on July 19, in response to the military uprising against the Popular Front government. EC's
context was uncomfortable: anarchosyndicalism, hegemonic in the summer of 1936, forced payment for
past police and "escamot" persecution, while the weakened Generalitat retained Companys' hostility
towards a force considered "inimical". EC therefore did not enter the Committee of Antifascist Militias,
unlike weaker formations such as Acció Catalana Republicana. Even having seized the newspaper Diario
de Barcelona, which, in Catalan, became its daily, EC did not obtain visibility through propaganda, nor
did it impose its presence in municipal revolutionary committees throughout the region. The two
communist rival parties saw the nationalist party as a quarry for militants, and so had no need to favor it;
nor did the anarchosyndicalists, who feared the nationalists, considering them, however
disproportionately, a danger. Threatened with a revenge death by anarchists, the EC leader Dencàs fled,
quite demonized, with the additional poor luck of leaving Barcelona on an Italian vessel (he moved to
France as soon as possible)128.
The ERC and the Generalitat, led by Companys, also overwhelmed, did its best to garner support
from "worker" parties while tolerating the savage repression going on throughout Catalonia. Companys
gave the president of the Catalan Parliament, Joan Casanovas i Maristany, a political rival, the chance of
heading a contrary policy, as new head of government: Casanovas could try to tame the revolution by
force, and take advantage of the de facto independence of Catalonia in the chaotic summer of 1936129. F r
nationalists in general, and especially for separatists, the paradox was that the "opportunity" for
independence went hand in hand with violent social confusion, in evident contradiction to the dream of an
orderly civil society becoming a public institution and a recognized State130. The obvious difficulty of his
task obliged Casanovas to favor the new EC, despite the fact that it was a two-month-old split of the
JEREC, but he had to tread cautiously, and so did little. At the end of September, Companys chose open
collaboration with the CNT and the PSUC, using Tarradellas as his new first councillor. The
"opportunity" (if such it was) was lost in a tawdry plot unveiled by Companys in November, which forced
Casanovas to flee and broke any hope that EC might play a major role131.
Nor was the internal situation of EC particularly favorable132. Rivalries were aggravated by the
existence of a masonic sector against clearly catholic elements133. Worse, ex-JEREC militants, used to
giving orders, clashed with the unruly pretensions of former PNC and NS! activists. Dencàs was replaced
as general secretary by Joan Torres i Picart, of the sector closest to Badia. Apparently, Torres attempted
to approach Casanovas, identified with a policy of public order, against Companys'advisers, like
Tarradellas and Miravitlles, defenders of an agreement with the CNT. But Casanovas only warmed to the
approach after he lost power, and so Torres became involved in intrigue against the new Tarradellas
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cabinet. Like Casanovas, Torres i Picart fled to France, where he spoke unguardedly to journalists,
complicating an already bad situation. Simultaneously, Cardona was caught, by anarchists of the Aragon
Council, in an operation rescuing priests (the party essentially financed its war effort by passing those
threatened with revolutionary reprisal over the Pyrenees, in exchange for payment); after a complicated
negotiation, he had to exile himself again to Perpignan. In the meantime, NS! militants within EC kept up
the usual oppositionist habits, bringing out the MNT's old title Ferms!, as a "unitary" protest against
erratic leadership.
The result of all of these complications was that Joan Cornudella took control of the party in a
meeting on November 29, after an assembly of delegates from local delegations held two days earlier.
Without any explicit political past, Cornudella was acceptable to all sectors. In favor of a paradoxical
approach to the CNT, especially once the December crisis of the Catalan government made more than
evident the rise of the PSUC, Cornudella had to face many internal complaints, due to the fact that, since
1933, the usual ultra-catalanist impulse was anti-CNT, a sentiment which, despite everything, led to
support of the Generalitat and, by extension, naturally reached out towards the "unified socialists". As a
result, despite whatever Cornudella might argue, in the notorious "May Incidents" of 1937, a short
uprising against "republican counterrevolution" led by restive anarchist sectors, the position of EC was
clearly contrary in Barcelona, where its militia came down from the Aragonese front, and in Reus, where
the party (led by Antoni Andreu Abelló) had a solid presence134.
Once the May uprising was over, with the relative eclipse of Tarradellas and lower visibility of
the anarchosyndicalists, excluded from the Catalan government, together with the growing intervention of
the central government, Cornudella's position, even if more coherent, led to faction fighting: Viçenç
Borrell, defender of a pro-PSUC line, issued a publication, L'insurgentintentionally invoking the shade
of the "martyr" Compte, in answer to the anti-communist alliance in Ferms!, and to a new weekly, Som!!,
expression of of the party Youth organization. In the midst of the squabbling, in July 1937, the party lost
control of the Diari de Barcelona, taken over by its workers, and, from mid-August on, brought out a
Diari de Catalunya. Without doubt, the appearance in August 1937 of a less than short-lived Partit
Nacional Català reflected the struggle between sectors within EC, probably being an attempted divorce by
ultranationalists unhappy with Cornudella and nostalgic for the old PNC. Coinciding with new intrigues
of Casanovas, who had returned from exile, the first ordinary EC congress was held at the beginning of
October, which silenced the most ostentous internal fights and reconfirmed Cornudella, even if Borrell
managed to form part of the general secretariat. In reality, with the Negrín central government in control
of Catalonia since May, and in the face of the desperate position of the republican cause, EC was dying as
an organization.
For their part, what remained of the official JEREC -outside EC and the PSUC- survived during
the Civil War, finally reduced to their formal function as youth section of the ERC, with Miravitlles, with
the full trust of Companys, as its protagonist. The JEREC participated, together with the ERC student
union, Federació Nacional d'Estudiants de Catalunya (FNEC) and other parallel entities, in the "Front de
la Joventut" set up in 1937 by the communist-led Joventuts Socialistes Unificades de Catalunya135. Its
lack of importance was countervailed by the FNEC, with significant membership, as well as in the always
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imaginative initiatives of Miravitlles, named head of a Propaganda Comissariat in the Generalitat, one of
the few real successes of the Catalan war effort.
The depressing context for Estat Català was paradoxically changed by republican defeat in 1939:
in exile, all of the political organizations lost their social base and were reduced to their most radical
militancy, a harsh fact which granted the radical nationalists a relative equality of footing which they had
been denied during the revolution. Furthermore, EC, with its paramilitary tradition and underground
habits, could expect to be exceptionally well adapted to surviving in difficult clandestine circumstances.
In practice, this was not to be. To begin with, the internal split worsened; the party was divided into two
parts, either Cornudella or Borrell, a feud reaffirmed in the concentration camps by mutual exclusion.
Despite the division, the most EC activists continued with Cornudella, his cousin Jaume Cornudella,
Antoni Andreu i Abelló, as well as the untiring Cardona, Domènec Ramon and Domingo Montserrat,
into a new Front Nacional de Catalunya (FNC), established in Paris at the end of 1939136. Formally, the
FNC was a "national front" for underground struggle, open to all Catalan parties, but in fact it was never
more than a joint platform for nationalists137. Once again, a major internal connection within the FNC was
the shared masonic link of many of its members. The FNC was able to carry on, for a time at least, in a
similar line to the Catalan National Council that superseded the Generalitat-in-exile after German
occupation authorities in France seized president Companys in 1940 and turned him over to the Franco
régime for trial and execution. Borrell, on the other hand, followed Casanovas in his opposition to
Companys and what he had represented. Accordingly, Casanovas' death in 1942 left Borrell politically
orphaned; his initiative to form "Patriotic Sections" as a rival option to the FNC failed138.
Catalan radical nationalists chose to hook up with Polish and French intelligence in 1939,
contacts that, although very important for "Enigma" work, did not prosper organizationally from the
catalanist viewpoint, especially when Allied intelligence in World War II in the Iberian peninsula ended
up dominated by the British, with whom Cornudella did not establish a good relationship139. Thus, despite
the fact that some of the outstanding spies for both the British (like the famous "Garbo") and the Russians
(like Trotsky's assassin Ramón Mercader) were individual Catalans, radical nationalism was unable to
take the initiative and assume protagonism of "Free Catalonia", as many militants would have desired140.
The generalized use of their slogans and ideas by more moderate exile groups worked against radical
nationalist relevance, rather than the other way around141. In any case, thoughout the middle 1940s, the
police of the Franco dictatorship broke up the ultra-catalanist underground, cutting off any direct
organizational continuity (as opposed to personalities) between the pre-1939 experience and the relative
renovation, almost exclusively neo-marxist, of the 1960s142.
The Distortion of Demonization
Miravitlles, by 1935 a key spokeman for Companys, penned a canny description of Dencàs'
ideology, as a Catalan "national socialist", caught between communist or fascist options:
It's been said that Dencàs was a fascist. Close friends of his assured that he was a communist. In
reality, he was neither one thing nor the other. In one of the few conversations that I had [with
him] he told me things that help to situate him politically. 'I'm a communist? I'm a fascist? I
myself don't know. What I do realize, however, is that any policy, to succeed, needs to move
young forces, to give a mystique, a discipline and carry them over to the terrain of action. In
Catalonia, that's what I want to do. I want to leave behind the old republican mold; I don't want
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to get into the mold -unknown here, at home- but old in other countries, of marxist dogmatics; [I
want] to form a young and ardent political movement held up by two principles: nationalism,
socialism." He was a sincere "national socialist".
In meetings, he would say things similar to those said by communists in countries submitted to a
national [i.e. right-wing] domination. Nationalist exaltation, socialist exaltation143
Miravitlles' irony went only so far. He himself, a few months later, would show the same
ambiguity in a sympathetic portrait of the new Parti Populaire Français of Doriot144.
Endowed with a certain naiveté, Catalan separatism never crossed the line to a willful
assumption of demonization. Marked since 1933 with the shadow of a doubt, radical nationalism
nevertheless tended towards communist solutions, their humanitarian content taken at face value, and
even the most recalcitrant ultra-catalanism resisted the leap to an open "fascist" position that, tactically
and ideologically, generated more contradictions than it solved. There never was any logic of "bourgeois
defense" to a "Catalan fascism": any force acting in name of the State, including the army, would always
do a better job in any really serious "class conflict". To the degree that one can speak of a "Catalan
fascism", it was always a hint, a tone, an accusation or a promise, but never a hard fact. The truth was that
in both form and content, Macià's Estat Català -and its many similarly-named successors, all variations on
a theme- were extremely similar to Mussolini's incipient fascism, except that, as a Döppelganger, Catalan
radical nationalism was its opposite: the vague leftist dream in pre-1914 European politics of a marriage
of nationalism and socialism, the ideal of a revolutionary force rather than a staid and bureaucratic party,
was realized in Catalan separatism, which remained on the left, as it was the negation of the Spanish
army145. The sustained dependency on Freemasonic references -and even ociability- of the majority trend
in radical catalanist political culture marked its ideological location. But more significant still, when push
came to shove, however conservative were its impulses in Catalan politics or rightist its intellectual
debates, on a Spanish stage, its decisive enemies always were on the right. Put in marxist-leninist terms,
why did the "bourgeoisie" need a "Catalan fascism", if they could participate in a project for a "fascist"
counterrevolutionary "New State"? There were scant possibilities for any real understanding by Catalan
radical nationalists with the Spanish right, because any rightist radicalization would necessarily intensify
a separatist stance.
So Macià and his heirs remained fixed at that par icular point of innocence on the ideological
axis from left to right to which Mussolini, a loathed pariah to the Italian Socialists, could never return.
Perhaps this was due to the lateral nature of Catalan and Spanish politics. But, in the interwar years,
Barcelona was a metropolitan city, slightly larger than Madrid, not much different in size from Milan.
Catalan political habits were notoriously more "French" than Spanish146. With suc  structural forces
behind him, Macià created a liberation movement capable of becoming by happenstance a single populist-
style party, a harbringer of slightly later events in Latin America. But, at heart, Catalan nationalism had a
serious problem with any fascist scheme: it conceived power in terms of civil society rather than the
State, and independence as physical guarantee to the full operational freedom of that same civil society.
For this reason, Catalan separatists could always come to some arrangement with the anarchosyndicalists
and vice-versa, even if they could also fight bitterly. Similarly, communism seemed attractive because it
talked about "class behavior", syndicates and factories, understood as physical, even tangible, values in
civil society, rather than with the idealization of the State and its vast power, which was, in Catalan
historical experience, distant and nasty. In addition, communism was much further away than fascism,
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Russia being unimaginable in real terms from Barcelona, while Italy was a known value, the manifest
alternative, across a short stretch of sea, to France, across the border. In Catalan separatism, the familiar
forms of Western European politics combined with the unusual circumstances of Spanish politics to
produce an illuminating exception.
In many ways, both political and intellectual, Catalonia in the first half of the Twentieth Century
was much more a cultural suburb of France -in Catalan translation and with a special link to Italy- than a
peculiar province of Spanish letters and ideology. Catalanism in particular represented the assumption of
French ideas, or, more correctly, the filter through which German and Central European concepts or
English and North American notions were imported, adjusted always to the centrality of Paris as a world
capital and to corresponding French political and intellectual fashions, with their characteristic
preocupations. Italian intellectual currents were an exciting alternative, with their taste of the upstart
challenge to Francocentrism, but also with the concession of dependancy towards Paris as a cultural hub
that was common to Barcelona; but Milanese innovation was never more than a counterpoint to whatever
was coming out of the "ville lumière". Madrid was nowhere in this perspective, except as a center of
government.
Accordingly, Catalan politics -as I have argued here- represented a special circumstance in
European political development up to the 1950s. Unlike strictly Spanish politics, with its self-indulgent,
self-preoccupied tradition of isolationism, Catalan nationalist politics ran on an European rythm, with the
same sort of ideological fascinations common to Western Europe, but with a strongly distorting
perception, given the centrifugal, anti-centralist, even anti-statist, trends focused on the Catalan capital.
While Catalan radical nationalists were not a significantly intellectual presence (rather the more
conservative Lliga and the moderate Acció Catalana had an effective monopoly there), the ongoing
experience of "separatist" militancy, and the possible models that ultracatalanists would interpret in their
own way, serve with hindsight to correct some of the more gratuitous generalizations that abound
concerning the relation between fascism and extremist nationalism in Twentieth-Century European
politics. The anomalous nature of Catalan radical nationalism, its exceptional preference for communism
instead of fascism, warns against the simplifications of interpretative theory.
NOTES
Portions of this article, aside form other references, make extensive use of my entries "Bloc Català
Treballista"; "Esquerra Catalanista"; "Estat Català [1922-1931]"; "Estat Català [1936-1939]"; "Estat Català-
Partit Proletari"; "Federació Democràtica Nacionalista"; "Front Nacional Català Proletari"; "Joventuts
d'Esquerra republicana-Estat Català"; "La Traza"; "Liga Patriótica Española"; "Moviment Nacionalista
Totalitari"; "Nosaltres Sols!"; "Partit Nacionalista Català"; in MOLAS, I.; CULLA, J.B. (eds.): Diccionari
dels partits polítics de Catalunya, segle XX. Barcelona, Enciclopèdia Catalana, 2000, p. 17, 68, 85-86, 86-88,
89-90, 104-105, 112-113, 142-143, 147-148, 150-151, 168-169, 177-178, 257-258. The article has been
completed under the "Sabbatical" program for twenty-five years of uninterrupted teaching at the Universitat
Autònoma de Barcelona, for which I am duly appreciative. I would also like to thank Stanley G. Payne and
Isidre Molas for their encouragement in writing this text. To avoid a profusion of capitalized terms, I have
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preferred to present all political denominations in lower case, except where a specific point is being made,
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